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This study seeks to answer a basic question: what are the merits and flaws of military intervention as a 
tool of conflict management in Africa? It uses a qualitative research approach and draws on existing 
literature on conflicts and military intervention in Africa. The study argues that military intervention and 
peacekeeping operations (PKOs) have become the most common approaches to conflict management in 
Africa. While these approaches have been effective in mitigating, or at least managing, most of the 
continent’s conflicts, they are not without lapses. In addition to human and financial costs, dubious 
intentions of interventions, and damning recent revelations of misdemeanour of peacekeepers, an 
additional troubling lapse of interventions and PKOs is their inability to address the fundamental causes 
of conflicts. Consequently, intervention-induced peace in most post-conflicts states remains tenuous, 
leaving them susceptible to relapse into conflict with the exit of peacekeepers. The article suggests that 
addressing the root causes is a better and a more sustainable way of mitigating conflicts and promoting 
peace in Africa.  
 





Africa holds an enviable, if not dubious, record of 
experiencing the highest number of conflicts in the world 
(SIPRI yearbook, 1999). While Africa accounted for 13 
percent of all civil wars in the 1960s, it was host to 35 
percent of the world‟s conflicts by the beginning of the 21st 
century (Walter, 2011).  
Consequently, the continent is riddled with insecurity 
and danger, which together pose various threats to peace. 
A daunting challenge facing the continent, and in particular 
the African Union (AU) is promoting peace and, in most 
cases, accelerating post-conflict reconstruction and 
development. The negative impacts of conflicts are all too 
familiar to be recounted. Suffice it to say that the World 
Bank (2011) notes that “the average cost of a civil war is 
equivalent to more than 30 years of GDP for a 
medium-sized developing country.” The AU and Africa‟s 
sub-regional organisations, including the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the 
Southern Africa Development Community (SADC), the 
East African Community (EAC) and the Economic 
Community of Central African States (ECCAS), have 
historically shouldered the burden of conflict management 
in Africa. 
However,  the recent most common approach to peace
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has been the use of military intervention, which takes the 
forms of peace-making or peacebuilding. Military 
interventions have been conducted singularly by either the 
AU or sub-regional bodies, or have been undertaken 
jointly with extra-African actors. The widespread use of 
this approach has, in a large measure, been necessitated 
by the often protracted nature of Africa‟s conflicts, 
dramatized in the failure of warring parties, especially 
insurgents, to cease fire and the devastating impact of 
conflicts within and beyond a country‟s borders. The article 
focuses on military intervention and peace-keeping 
operations (PKOs), which have become popular 
approaches to conflicts management. The central 
question addressed is: what are the main strengths and 





In answering the question earlier stated, the study adopts 
a qualitative and a non-experimental methodological 
approach, synthesizing a large body of existing literature 
on African conflicts and military intervention. Qualitative 
research seeks to understand and interpret situations and 
occurrences from the perspective of researchers (Spratt et 
al., 2004). Babbie and Mouton (2001: 80) argue that 
qualitative research seeks to describe situations and 
events. As such it is inductive in approach. 
However, as Roller and Lavrakas (2015) note, because 
it does not rely on numerical and statistical data, qualitative 
research does not seek to establish “truths”; rather it only 
seeks to establish the “plausibility” of interpretations. 
Conclusions on the efficacy of military intervention in 
Africa should thus be seen as plausibilities rather than 
scientific truths that can be replicated or verified over time 
and space. Thus, using a qualitative approach, the article 
concludes that while they often help end conflicts, military 
interventions also have drawbacks. Among other things, 
interventions entail financial and human costs, and they 
further have a tendency of being used as a pretext to 
advance the strategic interest of intervening states. Even 
more worryingly, interventions bring only temporary 
reprieve as these do not typically resolve the underlying 
causes of conflicts.  
In substantiating these central propositions, the article 
first grapples with the notion of peace. It thereafter briefly 
examines the causes of conflicts, which is followed by a 
prognosis on military interventions in Africa. The article 




Is peace truly the absence of war in Africa? 
 
Peace, one of the most cherished values of states, has a 
universal appeal. It has, however, remained elusive in a 
good number of countries in Africa, for various reasons. In 






Generally, the international environment is deemed to 
lack peace if it is wrought with various threats. Yet, while 
the social and political values of peace are universally 
accepted, its definition has remained nebulous and 
contentious. For example, against a backdrop of the 
authoritarian governance and the culture of suppression of 
human rights by the military junta in Burma, Aung San Suu 
Kyi, the famous victim of Burma‟s oppressive military- 
dominated political system, argued that peace flowed 
inexorably from conditions of justice and democracy. For 
Kyi, peace was predicated on justice and democracy, and 
not necessarily the absence of war, which remains the 
conventional definition of peace (Goodhand and Hulme 
1999).  
In Kyi‟s widely quoted aphorism, “where there is no 
justice there can be no secure peace” (Abrams, 1999). 
Although the epigraph was originally attributed to Martin 
Luther King Jr, during his campaign for black civil rights in 
the 1960s, Aung San Suu Kyi has claimed strong 
association with the statement. In recent years, the 
Burmese human rights activist has become a global icon, 
a symbol of democracy, justice and peace in the world.   
Historically, peace treaties, agreements and accords are 
signed either to end wars or after hostilities have ceased. 
Predating the modern state, peace agreements among 
warring protagonists have become an integral part of 
conflict management.  The association of peace with the 
absence of war is informed by the truism that the latter is 
inherently incompatible not just with the progress of a 
nation, but also with the holistic development of people. 
The UN Summit for the adoption of the post-2015 
development agenda (25 to 27 September 2015) noted 
that “there can be no sustainable development without 
peace and no peace without sustainable development” 
(UN 2015 - Resolution A/RES/70/1). The Summit perceived 
peace and development to be mutually reinforcing.  
However, in Africa, peace, the essential commodity for 
development and progress, is more than just the absence 
of war. A region devastated by various adversities – diseases, 
hunger, poverty, unemployment, diminishing livelihood 
resources, low incomes, and political oppression, among 
others – the absence of war is just one of the many 
preconditions for peace. There are impoverished countries 
in Africa, including Tanzania, Zambia, Ethiopia and 
Lesotho (Matsilele 2016), which are not witnessing 
conflicts, yet whose citizens could hardly be said to be at 
peace. Thus, under the exacting, if not traumatising 
socio-political, even decaying ecological conditions, it is no 
exaggeration to portend that peace is perpetually elusive 
in Africa. The depiction of peace as the absence of war, 
while logically sound, may be an inadequate definition in 
Africa. 
Accordingly, the conceptualisation of peace by former 
UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, is imperative in putting 
the concept in the peculiar context of Africa. In the forward 
to the 2000 edition of the celebrated series, The State of 





Kofi Annan, described peace as a holistic virtue, which 
accords opportunity to people, including children, a 
condition under which people lived free of fear and want. In 
his words, “….There is no duty more important than 
ensuring that [children‟s] rights are respected, that their 
welfare is protected, that their lives are free from fear and 
want and that they grow up in peace” (Annan 2000:4). 
Annan‟s comments were made in a decade where the 
protection of children and the security of the rights of 
people, especially the vulnerable, were top of the global 
agenda. In Annan‟s view, peace was linked to the security 
of people, summarised as “freedom from fear, and 
freedom from want” (UNDP, 1994).  
Notwithstanding, the visible inadequacy of defining 
peace as the antithesis of war, this article combines the 
conventional view of peace as representing conditions 
devoid of war and the perspective offered by Kofi Annan. 
Thus, peace is conceived of as the absence of war and 
threats to human security. Home to the highest number 
conflicts and socio-economic adversities, most African 
countries are scarcely at peace. 
 
 
Africa – the theatre of conflicts  
 
A thorough appreciation of the rational for military 
intervention as a peace process requires a deeper 
understanding of the complex causes of conflicts and 
rebellions in Africa. A wide range of factors are noted in the 
literature as causes of Africa‟s conflicts. For the present 
analysis, these are collapsed into political and governance; 
economic; environmental; and external factors. It is 
imperative to unpack, even if cursorily, the extent to which 
each of these either causes or exacerbates conflicts.  
 
 
Political and governance causes 
 
Intra-state conflicts have in some ways been the direct 
result of poor governance. Human rights abuses are rife 
and systematic and often target certain constituencies – 
political opponents of particular ethnic groups deemed 
unsympathetic to the government. In such cases, the state 
has been notorious in brutalising and repressing its own 
citizens.  
In some cases, such as in Darfur, where a systematic 
campaign of terror was waged on the population, at the 
behest of the state and in Zimbabwe between 2008 and 
2012, the state became a leading threat to human security 
(Akokpari, 2007). This development has been exacerbated 
by the partisan nature of the African state, which for 
political expediency, privileges certain constituencies over 
others. Privileged constituencies have access to resources 
and are given major political appointments, often in 
strategic ministries and parastatals.  
Members of privileged constituencies thus swim in 
opulence while the marginalised float in waters of poverty.  
With legitimate avenues  for  recourse  closed,  under- 




privileged constituencies resort to violence in an attempt to 
reverse the situation.  
Yet, within the broader context of the grotesque human 
rights abuses is the absence of genuine democracy 
despite the ubiquity of human rights-packed constitutions 
and the holding of periodic elections. Political life in a large 
number of African states hardly gives an indication of the 
prevalence of democratic precepts. Some governments 
and political elites remain practically unaccountable, in the 
face of corruption and disgusting scandals. Corruption and 
its inevitable offshoots – nepotism and neopatrimonialism 
– are rife. Allegations of corruption and nepotism are made 
in almost every rebellion against an African state. From the 
first Liberian conflict of 1990 to the recent military takeover 
in Mali in 2012, rebels complained of government 
ineptitude and corruption. Most African countries rank high 
on the corruption perception index compiled by the 
German-based non-governmental organisation (NGO), 
Transparency International. Even in relatively stable 
democracies such as South Africa and Ghana, leaders 
have either been perceived to be corrupt or accused of 
failing to deal decisively with it (Fihlani, 2016; Quansah, 
2015). In retrospect, corruption is rampant because it is 
part of the strategy used by Africa‟s political elite to 
maintain the dense web of patronage networks that help 
keep them in office.  
The struggle for the soul and control of the African state 
has been fierce since independence on account of 
perceived advantages. There is an erroneous perception 
among African politicians, and to some extent, the larger 
African population, that the state is everything; it is the 
epitome of resources, riches and affluence. Accordingly, 
access to the state is perceived as the ultimate prize in 
politics. Controlling the state means access to resources. 
In turn, this perception has raised the stakes in elections. 
Incumbent parties do everything possible, including 
rigging elections, to remain in power while opposition 
parties, desirous to win and control the state, dispute 
election results; even where neutral observers declare 
them as free, fair and credible. The dispute over elections 
has in some cases as, in Kenya in 2007, Zimbabwe 2008 
and Ivory Coast 2010, led to violence. The Kenyan 
post-election conflict in particular claimed 1000 lives and 
displaced over 500,000 (Yamano et al., 2010). The conflict 
rekindled old inter-ethnic rivalries and spread fear and 
insecurity among Kenyans, threatening the very existence 
of the Kenyan state. Some observers have, in fact, argued 
that the desire to control the state or gain access to it has 






Compounding governance factors are the widespread 
economic adversities engulfing most African countries. 
Indeed, only few sub-Saharan African countries have 
been  able  to  build  on  the  fortunes  of  their post- 




independence economies. Until the last decade, most 
African economies have seen consistent declines. The 
combined effects of conflict and uncertainty, have led to 
disinvestment and capital retreat from Africa. At the same 
time, the pursuit of inauspicious and self-destructive 
economic policies has vitiated the internal resilience of 
national economies. The state, which has traditionally 
been the leading employer, has failed to meet the 
employment expectations of Africans seeking jobs. For 
most employed Africans, salaries and wages are woefully 
inadequate to match the rising cost of living (Ezrow and 
Frantz, 2013).  
The growing gap between cost of living and salaries has 
led to widespread frustration, economic despondency and 
poverty. The World Bank (2012) estimated that in 2011 
nearly 43 percent of Sub-Saharan Africa‟s population lived 
below $1.90 a day, the highest in the world. Only South 
Asia (18.8 percent) came close.  Under taxing economic 
environment, destitute unemployed youth remain a volatile 
force needing only a spark from political adventurists to 
support rebellion. Most rebel leaders have pointed to the 
absence of economic opportunities and general adversities 
to justify insurgency. 
The World Bank (2011) acknowledged the functional 
correlation between poverty and the propensity for 
conflicts within states.  Although most African economies 
have been growing since the last decade (McKinsey 
Global Institute 2012, Economist 3 December 2011), how 
quickly the gains in growth translate into improved living 
conditions among the broad mass of Africans is an issue 
for posterity to tell. Indeed, In a seminal study, Collier and 
Hoeffler (2004) note that a variety of factors, including 
grievances, inequality poverty, economic growth among 
others impact on the prospects of civil wars and 
insurgency, although the degree of impact varies among 
the variables. However, while noting the factors 
contributing to insurgency and internal conflicts, Fearon 
and Laitin (2003) debunked the popular view that ethnicity 
was a major cause of conflict. They argue rather that there 
are certain structural conditions that predispose countries 
to civil wars. They note that poverty, political instability, 
weak institutions, among others, provide auspicious 
conditions for conflicts and insurgency.   
Religious fundamentalism has in recent years become a 
cause of conflict in Africa. This has attracted young 
Africans who have waged campaigns of terror against the 
state and civilians in an unbridled attempt to purge society 
of western social practices. Thus, the seemingly intractable 
conflict in Somalia has been due to al-Shabbab‟s 
intransigence and mission to islamise Somalia. Al- 
Shaabab use terror – bombings, kidnappings especially of 
women and rape – as part of its war campaign against the 
state (Zenn and Pearson, 2014).  
In Nigeria, Boko Haram, another fundamentalist Islamic 
sect, has been terrorising the Nigeria state since the last 
10 years in an attempt to purge the country of western 





with Al-Qaeda, which claimed responsibility for the 
dreadful 11 September 2001 attacks on the US (Wright, 
2006). Sometimes, too, secular contestations mutate into 
religious conflicts. Following the coup led by Michel 
Djotodia and Seleka rebels in the Central Africa Republic 
(CAR) on 24 March 2013 the conflict between the rebels 
and the state quickly became one between Muslims and 
Christians. Predominantly Muslims, the seleka rebels 
visited terror on the population. Subsequently, a new 
militia group, the anti-balaka, composed mainly of 
Christians emerged to counter the seleeka intransigence 
(HRW 2013). The growing phenomenon of Islamic 
fundamentalism has been attributed to the lack of 
adequate economic opportunities, the growing gap 
between the affluent few and the impoverished masses as 
well as widespread injustice in political systems. Thus, 
although intended to be a unifying factor, religion has 





Attention has recently been focused on the role of the 
environment in both initiating and escalating conflicts in 
Africa. To be sure, the contribution of environmental 
factors to conflicts takes various forms, two of which are 
noted here. First, environmental degradation diminishes 
natural resources upon which a good number of Africans 
depend for livelihood. Global warming causes floods and 
droughts, which diminish available agricultural lands. 
Some of the violent conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa have 
been linked to diminishing environmental resources (Obi, 
2000; Nordås and Gleditsch, 2007; Barnett and Adger, 
2007).  
Farming and pastoral communities have clashed in their 
search for fresh grazing and farming fields. One observer 
argued that the raging conflict in Darfur was nothing more 
than a clash between pastoral communities determined to 
secure their land and rivers from encroachers (Brown et 
al., 2007). The Darfur conflict, too, has been characterised 
by one observer as a “water war” (Tulloch, 2009). 
Similarly, in a study on the prolonged conflict in South 
Sudan, Suleiman and Omar (1994) concluded that it 
reflected a contestation between rival communities over 
fertile land in the region.  
Second, conflicts have arisen as a result of struggles to 
control the sources of minerals in most cases, to finance 
war machines. The involvement of Charles Taylor, the 
Liberian rebel leader, in Sierra Leone was widely believed 
to have been motivated by his desire to control the sources 
of diamond in Sierra Leone. Taylor‟s support for the Sierra 
Leonean rebels prolonged the war (1991 to 2002), which 
left more than 70,000 dead and 2.6 million displaced 
(UNDP, 2006). 
Other examples include Jonas Savimbi and the UNITA 
movement known to have fought and accounted for over 





(Laremont, 2002). The infamous intervention of Angola, 
Rwanda, Uganda and Zimbabwe in the DRC conflict in the 
early 2000s was believed to have been motivated by 
interests in the vast diamonds in the country (Nabudere, 
2003). The centrality of natural resources in starting, 
escalating and prolonging conflicts has led to the 
characterisation of Africa‟s conflicts as “resource wars” 
(Hyden, 2000). The inescapable irony is that rather than 
catalysing growth, development and peace, Africa‟s vast 
natural resources have become a curse; a sources of 





External factors, too, have influenced Africa‟s conflicts, 
even if indirectly. Africa‟s debt crisis, for example, has 
been seen by some observers as a cause of conflicts, 
albeit indirectly. Studies have shown that heavily indebted 
countries, displaying the trappings of poverty and social 
inequalities, were highly susceptible to internal strife and 
conflicts.  
The correlation between debt and economic crises, on 
the one hand, and conflicts on the other, established in the 
1990s, has so far not been contradicted. It was noted that 
about half of the third world‟s most indebted countries 
experienced conflicts (Smith, 1992; Smith, 2004). It was 
also found that only four of Africa‟s most indebted 
countries, including Niger, Sao Tome, Senegal and 
Tanzania, have so far not witnessed any major intra-state 
conflicts (Brown, 1997). The negative impact of 
globalisation and the insistence on the implementation of 
neoliberal market policies such as liberalisation, 
desubsidisation, devaluation, decontrolling and privati- 
sation, by external creditors, have exerted pressures on 
the fragile economies of sub-Saharan Africa. And, the 
uncertain global economic environment, frequently 
characterised by financial crisis and meltdowns, have not 
helped Africa‟s economies.  Together, these factors have 
harmed Africa‟s economies, accentuated unemployment 
and general economic insecurity, and created auspicious 
conditions for conflicts.  
The ending of the cold war left implications for conflicts 
in Africa. The cold war deepened and escalated Africa‟s 
conflicts as the leading protagonists – the US and Russia – 
supported opposing contestants either directly or indirectly 
through proxies, thus escalating or prolonging conflicts. 
The abatement of the cold war hardly improved prospects 
for peace; rather the new international environment 
provided fresh opportunities for conflicts. Constituencies 
which were brutalised by regimes that previously received 
support from Cold War protagonists rebelled against the 
weakened state. Rebellion spread and regimes fell as the 
latter lost external support – financial and military – to keep 
them on their feet. 
The rebellion by Liberia‟s Samuel Doe succeeded 
largely because President William Tolbert lacked western 
support,  following  the  country‟s  loss   of   strategic  




importance to the west. Similarly, Mobutu Sese Seko, the 
Zairean (now DRC) strongman, who enjoyed unflinching 
western support during the cold war despite his corruption 
and oppression, became defenceless in the face of rebel 
intransigence after the cold war.  
Subsequently, both Liberia and the DRC fell into cycles 
of prolonged conflicts. Although Liberia and the DRC have 
since held elections after years of conflicts, the peace in 
these countries remains tenuous at best.
1
 The debate 
about whether exogenous factors are more important than 
internal factors in explaining Africa‟s conflict is certain to 
continue. Irrespective of the outcome of the debate the fact 
is that Africa remains an undisputed theatre of conflicts. 
While some of the conflicts – Liberia, Sierra Leone, 
Burundi and Ivory Coast – have been resolved and peace, 
albeit fragile, installed, others, such as those in Somalia, 
Darfur and the CAR remain seemingly intractable. In 
nearly all these conflicts, some form of military intervention 




Military intervention and PKOs as peace making 
instruments – the merits 
 
Peace processes in Africa have frequently involved 
military interventions either for peace-making, peace- 
keeping or peacebuilding. Although these terms are often 
loosely used interchangeably in the security literature, they 
are technically speaking different. In peace-making the 
intervening force imposes peace by separating 
combatants and ensuring the cessation of conflict. 
Peacekeeping occurs after combatants have ceased fire, 
usually through signing an agreement, and an intervention 
force coming in to observe and maintain the truce 
(Feldman, 2008).  
Peacebuilding is also different and may be undertaken 
in pre- and post-conflict situations. According to Coning 
(2013) peacebuilding is the process of creating conditions 
and structures that prevent the ignition, continuation or, in 
the cases of post-conflict situations, relapse into conflict. 
Peacebuilding may or may not involve military intervention, 
but typically requires the combine efforts of both local and 
external actors.  
Since 2000, the justification for military intervention in 
conflicts was provided for by Article 4(h) of the Constitutive 
Act of the AU which affirms “the right of the Union to 
intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the 
Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war 
crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity” (Witt, 
2013). The provision  was  in  sharp  contrast  to  the 
                                                          
1 Liberia has since the ending of the war held two successful rounds of elections 
– in 2005 and 2011. The DRC also held two presidential elections in 2006 and 
2011 whose outcome were riddled with controversy, but which both returned 
Joseph Kabila as president. The next presidential elections are scheduled for 27 
November 2016. However, on 17 October 2016, the DRC Constitutional Court 
upheld the country’s Independent Electoral Commission (CENI) plea to move 
the elections to 2018 because of inadequate resouces. 




non-interference posture of the defunct Organisation of 
African Unity (OAU). In turn, the AU‟s new interventionist 
position was strengthened by the adoption of the Right to 
Protect (R2P) doctrine in 2005 by the UN General 
Assembly (World Summit). R2P was contained in the 
report of the 2001 International Commission on 
Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) and was aimed 
at protecting people from genocide, war crimes, crimes 
against humanity and ethnic cleansing. R2P was adopted 
against the background of the horrific Rwandan genocide 
of 1990 and the Bosnian war five years later.  
Thus, for the AU, the time had come for a paradigm shift 
from “non-interference to non-indifference” (Mwanasali 
2008). Consistent with this new approach to peace 
building, the AU and its sub-regional bodies have made 
conscious efforts to militarily intervene in various conflicts 
since 2002. Notable examples included the AU Mission in 
Burundi – AMIB (2003), the AU Mission in Somalia- 
AMISOM (2007), the AU Mission in Darfur – UNAMID 
(2007) and recently, the AU‟s intervention in the Central 
African Republic (CAR). Interventions by sub-regional 
bodies included the ECOWAS interventions in Liberia 
(1990), Sierra Leone (1997), Guinea Bissau (1999) and 
Ivory Coast (2010). Military interventions in Southern 
Africa included SADC‟s intervention in Lesotho (1998), 
and its controversial and ill-fated intervention in the DRC 
conflict in 2005, in which only Angola, Namibia and 
Zimbabwe, of the 15-member SADC states, participated. 
Typically, military intervention has been considered 
when non-military initiatives to prevent or end conflicts are 
deemed to have failed or are deemed to lack prospects of 
success.  Over the years, military intervention has proved 
beneficial in cases where it remained the only way of 
ending conflict and mass killings. The 1994 Rwandan 
genocide would have been contained had there been an 
African or UN-led intervention force on the ground (Power 
2001, Dorn and Matloff 2000). In a study of the NATO 
intervention on Kosovo in 1999, Morton (2014) notes that 
although military intervention has some disadvantages, 
including the possibility of causing civilian casualties, it 
helped protect Kosovar Albanians and other minorities 
from Serbian forces. Interventions thus help to end 
conflicts. The murder and mayhem that have characterised 
Somalia since the abdication of Mohamed Siad Barre in 
1991, has not completely abated. 
However, the scale of violence has reduced, even if 
marginally, since 2010 largely because of the combined 
presence of AMISOM and Kenyan troops. The latter 
entered Somalia in 2011 in response to Al-Shabaab terror 
acts in Kenya. In Sierra Leone, the Revolutionary United 
Front (RUF) campaign of maiming unsympathetic civilians 
was only ended with the intervention of the ECOWAS 
Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). Similarly, the presence of 
the UN-AU hybrid Force in Darfur has helped to scale 
down the atrocities of the Janjaweed against the black, 
and non-culturally Arabised population of Darfur. Long- 





reconstruction, such as the re-building of infrastructure – 
roads, hospitals and schools – can improve the quality of 
civilian life and accelerate the return to post-conflict 
normalcy. 
In turn, this can stimulate economic activities, which are 
often dormant or abandoned under conditions of conflict. 
In general, by virtue of ending conflicts, successful military 
interventions create conditions for peace and stability 
thereby giving hope of a return to normal life to civilian 
populations. In most cases, the military has assisted or at 
least laid the grounds for post-conflict reconstruction and 
development. Such measures have been evident in the 
processes of disarmament, demobilisation and 
reintegration (DDR) of ex-combatants into civilian life in 
Liberia, Sierra Leone and Ivory Coast, among other 
post-conflict countries; security sector reforms (SSR) in 
Sierra Leone and Ivory Coast, leading to stability and the 
resumption of aid from the international community.  
Moreover, the repairs of broken infrastructure and the 
construction of new ones – schools, roads, hospitals, etc. 
– could begin. In some instances, peacekeepers have 
assisted in the conduct of post-conflict elections as AMIB 
did in Burundi in 2005. Civilian populations emerge from 
conflict traumatised and impoverished as economic 
activities and sources of livelihood are devastated. Yet, 
such populations are glad to have, at least in the short 
term, impoverished lives in tranquillity than wealth with 
trauma and danger.  
 
 
The downsides of intervention and PKOs 
 
The merits of military intervention do not suggest the 
absence of drawbacks. On the contrary, military 
interventions generally, and those in Africa in particular, 
have been wrought with lapses, challenges and negative 
outcomes. The first visible lapse of military intervention is 
its failure to address the root causes of conflicts. The 
leading motivations for intervention are usually moral – to 
end conflicts and stop the killing and suffering of civilian 
populations, especially women and children; and political 
– to prevent conflicts and associated trappings (refugees, 
proliferation of arms and crime) from spreading beyond the 
borders of the beleaguered country. As such, where 
regional organisations fail to put in place measures to 
stabilise the post-conflict country, a relapse into war after 
the exit of peacekeepers becomes almost inevitable.  
In 1991, ECOWAS leaders argued, and quite 
compellingly, that the subregion could be destabilised by 
massive outpours of refugees and the proliferation of light 
weapons of war, if the Liberian conflict was not speedily 
ended. ECOWAS thus intervened with ECOMOG, ended 
the conflict and helped organise elections in 1997, which 
returned Charles Taylor, the main rebel leader, as 
president. However, since the underlying causes of the 
conflict – corruption and clientelism, ethnic privileging, 





relapsed into conflict in 1999, just two years after the 
elections.  
In Mali, Ivory Coast, Burundi, the DRC and in nearly all 
countries that have once gone through conflicts in which 
some form of military intervention was used, there have 
either been post-conflict skirmishes between former 
protagonists or real threats of relapse into full scale conflict 
after the exit of peacekeepers largely because the original 
causes of the conflicts were never fully addressed. 
Evidence of this is seen in the continued presence of 
international peacekeepers and the frequent reluctance of 
refugees to accede to repatriation for fear of retribution 
and or insecurity.  Studies have found that poor SSA 
countries, which have experienced civil wars, are most 
likely to suffer a relapse (Walter, 2011). This is particularly 
so if fundamental causes of the conflict are not resolved, 
even with peacebuilding measures in place. 
Military interventions and peace operations in general 
come at huge human costs. UN PKOs keep accurate 
records of troop fatalities. This, however, cannot be said of 
AU peace operations. As such, numbers of casualties 
among AU peacekeepers remain shrouded in secrecy in 
turn generating controversy. While local press houses 
tend to inflate, governments, for political expediency, tend 
to underreport fatality numbers (Williams, 2015). This 
notwithstanding, Mills and Davis (2016) estimate that 
AMISOM, which as at January 2015 numbered 22,000 
uniformed personnel, lost over 4,000 troops during the 
8-year period between March 2007 and January 2015 
largely through Al-Shabaab attacks and reprisals.  
A former Nigerian ECOMOG commander revealed in 
2002 that he supervised the burial of “hundreds of Nigerian 
casualties from Liberia” (May, 2004). Peace operations 
undertaken solely by Africans tend to suffer high fatalities 
largely because they are most often ill-equipped. As May 
(2004) notes over a decade ago: “….. there have been 
many cases of Third World contingents arriving [as 
peacekeepers] with nothing more than the clothes on their 
backs and asking the UN to provide everything, including 
weapons and underwear.” In fact, even UN-sponsored 
peace operations are not immune to casualties as Table 1 
shows (UN Peacekeeping Factsheet, 2016). Critics of 
humanitarian intervention have argued that it is morally 
unjust for states to risk the lives of their peacekeeping 
soldiers in conflicts that have no bearing on their lives. 
They maintain further that states have social contracts with 
their citizens, which obligate them to protect the latter 
(Nicholas and Bellemy, 2001). 
In addition to human costs, PKOs entail huge financial 
implications for the AU and regional organisations (Table 
1). The high financial costs of PKOs often explain why 
some peace operations are speedily, sometime 
prematurely, ended. In turn this partly explains why often 
insufficient anti-relapse measures are put in place. The 
AU, which is expected to oversee and finance 
humanitarian interventions in Africa, is cash-strapped. 
Consequently, it has been relying of  extra-African actors  




and individual African states to finance PKOs. 
Humanitarian interventions in Africa thus frequently suffer 
intervention fatigue. In 2005, AMIB was financed almost 
entirely by South Africa, which also had the largest 
contingent of troops in the operation. The UN was 
reluctant to send peacekeepers until the situation showed 
evidence of stabilisation. However, desirous to make an 
early exit from Burundi, South Africa helped conduct 
election, which brought Pierre Nkurunziza, a former rebel 
leader, as president. Ten years on, Burundi almost went to 
war as president Nkurunziza sought and was 
controversially elected into a third term in contravention of 
the country‟s constitution.    
As the AU shows an increasing incapacity to finance 
peace operations, Africa has come to rely heavily on 
external assistance. In 2011, for example, external actors, 
including the EU, China and the US accounted for 60 
percent of the entire AU budget of $260 million (The 
Economists 27 January 2011). The financial challenges of 
the AU are compounded by the failure of member states to 
timeously make their annual contributions. Five members 
– Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Nigeria and South Africa – make 
the largest financial contributions. In 2011, these countries 
each contributed $15 million while the majority of member 
states contributed much lesser amounts ranging from 
$160,000 to as little as $20,000 by Malawi (ibid). The EU 
presently covers the full cost of AMISOM soldiers, which 
amounts to $200 million annually (Kelley 2016). The AU 
standby force, which was originally scheduled to be ready 
for expeditious deployment to trouble spots by 2010, is still 
not fully in place. The AU therefore has relied on the 
contributions of troops from member countries, which has 
not proved to be a particularly reliable measure. Often, 
countries default in supplying troops although they make 
commitments.  
In addition, the AU relies on external actors for logistics, 
which has tended to undermine the effectiveness of the 
continental body in resolving conflicts. Until the UN 
established a hybrid force in Darfur, the AU Mission in 
Sudan (AMIS) 7,000-personnel force was over-stretched, 
ill-equipped and poorly financed. The force was 
inadequate to effectively deal with a conflict in a region as 
large as France (Akokpari, 2011). The weakness of the AU 
and regional bodies to resolve conflicts was badly exposed 
in the Ivory Coast post-election conflict in 2010-2011. The 
refusal of defeated incumbent, Laurent Gbagbo, to cede 
power to his victorious rival, Alassane Ouattara, led to a 
violent two-year conflict between supporters of the rival 
candidates. ECOWAS‟s threats to use force to oust 
Gbagbo came to naught until the intervention of French 
troops that helped to forcibly dislodge Gbagbo from office 
(Mail online 12 April 2011). The conflicts in Eastern DRC, 
CAR and recently in Mali all vividly showed the weakness 
of the AU to single-handedly mitigate conflicts. The much 
trumpeted “African solutions to African problems” is 
increasingly becoming a mythical slogan as far as Africa‟s 
ability to solely undertake and finance PKOs is concerned.  




Table 1. UN peacekeeping operations in Africa as at January 2016. 
 




UN Approved Budget 









April 1991 26 495 15 $53, 190,000 
       
 
Liberia 
UN Mission in 
Liberia (UNMIL) 
Sept 2003 2,626 5,224 196 $344,712, 200 
       
Cote 
d‟Ivoire 
UN Operations in 
Cote d‟Ivoire 
(UNOCI) 
April 2004 4,457 7,120 137 $402,794,300 





Operation in Darfur 
(UNAMID) 
July 2007 14,345 21,022 230 $1,102,164,700 





Mission in the DRC 
(MONUSCO) 
July 2010 16,938 22,492 100 $1,332,178,600 






Force for Abyei 
(UNISFA) 




       
South 
Sudan 
UN Mission of South 
Sudan (UNMISS) 
July 2011 11,782 15,509 42 $1,085,769,200 








in Mali (MINUSMA) 















in Central African 
Republic 
(MINUSCA) 
April 2014 9,639 12,627 19 $814,066,800 
       
- - Totals 74,868 120,454 840 $6,326,438,300 
 
*Total personnel include troops, police, military observers, international and local civilians, and UN volunteers (Source: UN Peacekeeping 




As well, the motives of some interventions have often 
come under question. It is often suspected that some 
PKOs are instigated as a pretext to serve the economic 
and strategic interests of leading or  dominant  countries. 
The Nigeria-led ECOWAS intervention in Liberia in 1999 
was perceived to have been motivated by the strategic 
ambitions of General Ibrahim Babangida who sought to 





demise of military leaders in the West Africa.
2
  
Similarly, Zimbabwe, then chair of SADC, led a regional 
intervention force composed of troops from Zimbabwe, 
Angola and Namibia, into DRC in 1998. The intervention 
was believed to have been motivated by Harare‟s 
economic interests in the DRC. The Zimbabwean, a local 
newspaper, reported in 2008 that “Kabila and Mugabe had 
signed a US$200 million contract involving corporations 
owned by Mugabe and his family, and there were several 
reports in 1998 of numerous mining contracts being 
negotiated with companies under the control of the 
Mugabe family”
 
(The Zimbabwean, 10 November 2008).
 
As well, the 2008 South Africa-led SADC intervention in 
Lesotho was believed to have been induced by Pretoria‟s 
quest to protect its economic interests, especially the 
Lesotho Highlands Water project, which is the main source 
of water to the country‟s industrial province of Gauteng. 
Also, South Africa pushed for the deployment of an AU 
force in the CAR in 2014 after 13 members of the South 
African National Defence Force (SANDF) helping to train 
the CAR military were ambushed and killed by CAR rebels 
in March 2013. The entry into DRC by Rwanda and 
Ugandan forces between 1998 and 2004 was aimed at 
securing their common borders and aiding Tutsi rebels. 
Ulterior motives, often the desire for interest protection, 
almost always seem to underlie military interventions led 
by African states.  
While motives of interventions are increasingly becoming 
a source of concern, cases of alleged misdemeanour of 
peacekeepers is further discrediting PKOs. Peacekeepers 
have in recent years come under scrutiny as allegations of 
rape, looting and becoming a new source of atrocities to 
civilians, have surfaced. Peacekeepers in the CAR have 
been reported to have raped, engaged in transactional sex 
with local women and leading to the production of what is 
now called “peacekeeper babies.” Sadly only one of the 42 
cases of the sexual exploitation cases registered was 
criminally filed (Sief, 2016). In the DRC, too, more than 
150 allegations of rape, soliciting of sex, abuse and 
transactional sex involving peacekeepers were reported in 
the early 2000s (ibid). Some of the troops committing such 
sexual crimes were originally AU operation troops who 
were later grafted into the UN mission. In Sierra Leone, 
HRW reported “several cases of sexual violence by 
UNAMSIL peacekeepers, including the rape of a 
twelve-year old girl in Bo by a soldier of the Guinean 
peacekeeping contingent in March 2001 and a gang rape 
of a woman by two Ukrainian peacekeepers in April 2002 
near Kanema” (HRW 2003: 28). Disconcertingly, there is 
often reluctance on the part of PKO commanders to 
investigate and punish perpetrators of such sexual 
violence (ibid). Other forms  of  misconduct  by  peace-  
                                                          
2 By 1990 when Charles Taylor’s rebellion broke out only two countries – 
Senegal and Gambia – among the 16 states in West Africa had democratically 
elected governments. All other countries were under military generals. Fears of 
the spread of rebellion were heightened among West Africa’s military rulers, 
moreover, because that was also a period when the wind of democracy was 
blowing across the third world and sweeping dictators aside.  




keepers have also surfaced. Five AMISOM troops from 
Uganda were arrested in June 2016, after being caught 
“red handed” for selling military supplies to civilians in 
Mogadishu (The Guardian 7 June 2016). These incidences 
are increasingly compounding the litany of lapses and 





Africa remains a notorious theatre of conflicts. While 
negotiations and dialogue have been used to resolve 
them, these have yielded little peace dividends. 
Consequently, humanitarian interventions have been used 
by the AU and sub-regional bodies to end conflicts and to 
promote peace. Although peace has been assumed to 
prevail in a conflict-free environment, this is hardly true for 
Africa. A mix of economic adversities, poverty, diseases, 
crime, and unemployment has left the majority of Africa‟s 
population destitute, exasperated and hardly at peace.  
While the AU has not been able to craft a continental 
response to the non-conflict threats facing Africa, it has 
found a response to conflicts in military interventions. The 
Constitutive Act of the AU legitimised interventions in 
conflicts in cases where grotesque human right violations 
are being committed and where the state appears 
incapable of terminating and promoting peace. Today, the 
AU‟s most popular response to conflicts is the use of 
interventions and PKOs as witnessed in the management 
of conflicts across the continent. The frequency and 
intensity of conflicts means the interventions and PKOs 
will remain key features of the AU‟s conflict management 
strategies. Moreover, most of the fundamental causes of 
conflicts – political, economic, religious, environmental 
and external factors – appear, for the moment 
insurmountable given the very nature of Africa‟s political 
economy. 
There is hardly any doubt that Africa‟s PKOs have 
helped terminate or at least managed most of the 
continent‟s conflicts and restored peace, albeit often 
tenuous. Yet, there are a number of lapses that 
characterise intervention and general PKOs. The fact that 
these fail to address the structural causes of conflicts, 
leaving post-conflict states susceptible to relapse is a 
leading concern. This is coupled with the financial and 
human costs that attend interventions and PKOs. This 
said, however, military interventions and PKOs are worth 
pursuing. In a region of incessant conflicts, intervention 
with lapses may be preferable to indifference with grave 
consequences. Interventions deal mostly with the eruption 
of conflicts. It is expedient for vulnerable and conflict-prone 
African states to be assisted to build or and strengthen 
conflict-prevention institutions, including stable 
democracies, stronger democratic institutions and building 
stronger economies that help reduce the tendency 
towards intra-state conflicts. Herein lies the need for the 
wider international community to be part of Africa‟s conflict 
management efforts. 
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